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Abstract 
Since 2009 the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have 
conducted counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to 
tackle Somalia based piracy. As the two organizations are arguably the most 
important security providers for Europe they have also moved towards managing 
the similar tasks in military and crisis management operations. As Brussels 
officials and academics are debating duplication of efforts and competition, staff 
from operational level has emphasized the excellent cooperation which takes 
place below the surface of political level in the operations.  
 
This thesis studies the effects of institutional competition between the European 
Union and NATO in their respective counter-piracy operations off the Horn of 
Africa. It takes the approach that there is a case of institutional competition, but 
that this competition generates positive outcomes such as learning and 
experimentation, increased transparency as well as new solutions.   
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1 PART I  
 
Introduction 
 
Since the end of the cold war, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) have been in rapid transformation. As the two 
organizations have moved from their original raison d'être and clear division of 
labor (the European Union as an economic power and NATO as a military 
power), the issue on cooperation versus competition has been hotly debated in 
Brussels
1
. While efforts have been made to bring the two organizations together, 
the lack of communication and cooperation on political level has been seen as 
remarkable, especially since the organizations have most of their member states in 
common and are based in Brussels
2
. 
 
As official communiqués from the organizations describe a close and strategic 
partnership, critics claim that there is a “political deadlock” or “frozen conflict” 
which impede any efforts to establish institutional relations
3
. This conflict has 
been visible in the realm of security and defense matters and there have been 
concerns about the duplication of efforts in cases where the EU and NATO have 
conducted simultaneous military and crisis management operations in the same 
operational theatres
4
.  
 
There are researchers who remark that while there is a case of political 
competition between EU and NATO in Brussels, cooperation on the ground is 
smooth
5
. There are also scholars who hypothesize that an increased number of 
institutions performing similar tasks in policy areas and competing for resources 
and tasks could have positive effects. These effects include the ability to improve 
practices by learning from competition and experimentation to find new solutions 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 Hofmann, 2008; Hofmann 2013   
2
 The European Union and NATO currently have 22 of 28 member states in common. Albania, Canada, Norway, 
Turkey and the United States and Canada are NATO members, but not members of the European Union. Austria, 
Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are members of the European Union and NATO’s Partnership for Peace, but 
not members of NATO. See also NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2007.  
3
 NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm;  
Hofmann & Reynolds, 2007  
4
 See for instance NATO 1; Lachowski, 2002; and Hofmann & Reynolds, 2007; and Smith, 2010   
5
 Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013, p. 33  
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for cooperation
6
. The idea is that these learning experiences could be beneficial 
for society at large
7
.   
 
One case which has been described by officials from both organizations as an 
excellent example of EU and NATO cooperation is their respective counter-piracy 
missions, EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield 
to tackle Somalia based piracy. In this case, the EU and NATO have performed 
similar tasks in the same operational theatre without formal agreements for 
cooperation with overwhelmingly positive results. With the combined efforts of 
the navies, shipping industry and the international community the piracy problem 
is currently said to be suppressed, with only two reported attacks since May 2012. 
This success has been specially accredited to the cooperation between the navies
8
. 
 
While a majority of academic research has focused on the negative aspects of EU 
and NATO relations, such as the inability to discuss the things that really matter, 
or to meet at all
9
, this study will look into one area of research which has not been 
studied, namely the effects of institutional competition between the EU and 
NATO, and if this competition can generate positive outcomes. 
 
This thesis will assess the effects of institutional competition in the case of EU 
and NATO interaction in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in their 
respective counter-piracy operations, Operation Atalanta and Operation Ocean 
Shield. This case is relevant to research since it is a case of the EU and NATO 
performing the similar tasks in the same area of operation, which in theory gives 
member states of both organizations a choice between favorable institutional 
frameworks, creating a textbook example of institutional competition
10
.   
 
Looking at maritime security is also timely as the European Union and NATO are 
in the process of developing new maritime security strategies. Moreover, they 
have both aimed to use the comprehensive approach to tackle maritime piracy, as 
well as interacted with the international community. Lessons learnt from these 
operations could be valuable for future military and crisis management operations 
as well as a model for international cooperation
11
.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 Bergh & Höijer, 2008 
7
 Ibid., xi  
8
 Bridger, 2013; Interview NATO HQ, January 2014   
9
 Hofmann & Reynolds, 2009, p. 1  
10
 Bergh & Höijer, 2008, xv  
11
 NATO Shipping Center “OOS Background”;EU NAVFOR Atalanta  
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1.1 Research Question 
The research question is interesting since it can be seen as a contradiction, where 
it poses that competition, which is usually regarded as something negative can 
generate the exact opposite outcomes and have positive effects. This is relevant in 
the case of the operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean where ground 
level staff have described the cooperation as excellent as opposed to the 
dominating academic literature which calls EU and NATO cooperation in general 
“remarkably bad”, “dysfunctional” and “not working at all”12.  
 
In light of the above, the research question to guide this thesis is as follows:  
 
How can institutional competition contribute to improved cooperation and new 
solutions? 
1.2 The Aim of the Study 
The aim of this study is to assess effects of institutional competition between the 
European Union and NATO. By doing so, another objective is to give a new perspective 
to the debate on EU and NATO relations. 
1.3 Why Study EU and NATO Relations? 
The study of security lies at the heart of the International Relations (IR) discipline 
which at its core analyzes the interaction between states
13
.  
 
During the Cold War era, the realist view dominated the studies on international 
relations and it asserts that states are the key actors in the international system 
which is characterized by anarchy and competition for power, resources and 
influence
14
. The end of the Cold War has given way to a number of new 
explanatory models for security cooperation and especially for the liberal 
paradigm. The notion of cooperative security and a changing international 
security environment with more actors involved, and a more diffuse distribution 
of power make the interaction between institutions relevant to research
15
.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12
 Interviews EU and NATO, January 2014; See for instance the DIIS report ”Cooperative Security: NATO’s 
Partnership Policy in a Changing World” 2014:01 
13
 Collins, 2007  
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Flockhart (2014) “Changing Partnerships in a Changing World”, p. 20 
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The European Union and NATO are arguably Europe’s most important security 
providers, and they are examples of well-established and robust multilateral 
institutions. While the study of multilateral institutions is popular in academia, EU 
and NATO are commonly studied in isolation from one another, which could be 
due to the lack of institutionalized forms of cooperation
16
. 
 
As the European Union and NATO have been in rapid transformation the past 
twenty years the institutions have moved towards managing the same security 
related tasks with the European Union increasingly engaging in military 
operations and NATO taking on crises management responsibilities. While their 
cooperation or lack of cooperation is interesting to research per se, there have not 
been analyses that take the next step and look to the effects of the competition 
between these institutions. 
 
The idea that competition can generate positive outcomes is a new approach to the 
debate on EU and NATO, but there have already been indications that the 
deadlock on political level has forced officials on operational level to “solve 
problems before they reach Brussels
17”. One researcher describes this discrepancy 
between EU and NATO on political and operational level: 
 
 ”Actors on the ground in missions where EU and NATO forces are deployed side 
by side have learnt to cope with these competitive and dysfunctional dynamics 
through informal and ad hoc cooperation at lower levels
18” 
 
While the dominating paradigm in academic research related to security studies 
and international relations has shifted focus from realism to liberalism and a more 
positive way to explain why states choose to cooperate in security and defense 
matters
19
, it is most relevant to study the EU and NATO relations to look to the 
outcomes when they fail to do so. This could also be generalizable to other cases 
of institutional competition, whether or not it refers to EU and NATO specifically, 
or when they are engaging with other actors in international relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16
 Hofmann, 2010 
17
 Debate held in Brussels, May 2014; Smith, 2010; and Hofmann, 2013   
18
 Hofmann,  2010,  p. 2 
19
 Collins, 2007 
  5 
1.4 Existing Studies on EU and NATO Relations 
Several studies of the European Union and NATO give explanations to their 
expansion and integration, but they are as has been mentioned, commonly 
assessed in isolation from each other
20
.  
 
There are however examples of the European Union and NATO relations being 
studied through game theory, rational choice theory and by comparison of 
neoliberal and neorealist views to assess which explanatory model is better suited 
to explain their interaction.  
 
While the enthusiastic liberal view which dominated the post Cold War security 
studies in the 1990s, such as the notion that the West had won the Cold War
21
, the 
twenty-first century so far has been characterized by the inclusion of  more actors 
and a broader spectrum of issues when studying international security 
cooperation
22
. Security is no longer seen in terms of only military power and 
deterrence but it includes various concepts of security such as human security, 
economic and political security as well as environmental security
23
.  
 
Recently, scholars have looked at NATO in terms of new cooperative security 
concepts which refer to new power constellations and ways of cooperating. This 
view predicts a change from a one-directional way of cooperating where NATO 
“tells other what to do and get them to join in”, to a co-procedure of shaping 
policies where actions origin from the outside and not from the inside
24
. This is a 
view that looks at this diversity of actors beyond the scope of European security, 
and through broader measures, and NATO’s partnership programs as well as their 
cooperation with other actors can be seen as examples of this shift.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20
 See for instance Mearsheimer, 1990 
21
 Flockhart, 2014,  p. 17. See also Francis Fukuyama’s influential essay “The End of History?” where the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy is predicted the final form of government.  
22
 Collins, 2007 
23
 Ibid.    
24
 Waever in Flockhard , 2014, “Cooperative Security – A New Concept?” p. 47-60 
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2 Method and Materials 
The method chosen for this study is qualitative analysis on a single case study, 
namely the interaction between the European Union and NATO in their respective 
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. 
 
This case is chosen since it is an example of the two institutions performing similar 
tasks under the same mandate in the same area of operation. The two institutions can 
also be seen as overlapping in terms of member states, and using military assets 
from the same national pool of resources, which links it directly to the theoretical 
framework used
25
.    
 
First, the study sets out to define the case of institutional competition between the 
European Union and NATO. It does so by presenting aspects of their institutional 
design, resources and coordination which can be seen to indicate cases of 
institutional competition
26
. These sections describe significant events that have 
shaped the cooperation between the European Union and NATO, as well as the 
attempts to create formal institutionalized relations. This background is necessary in 
order to understand the complex dynamics that affect the institutions today, even if 
the political landscape has changed since
27
. These are all variables which can be 
seen to have effect on the cooperation and coordination at large.  
 
The study uses the main ideas drawn from a theoretical framework by economic 
scholars Bergh and Höijer, namely that institutional competition can facilitate 
learning and experimentation, increase democracy and create new solutions. This 
approach is relevant in light of previous and existing studies on institutional 
competition and security cooperation since it is the general idea that a diversity of 
actors and competition could lead to these effects which in turn could have positive 
outcomes on society at large
28
.  
 
Operational staff from the European Union, NATO and other stakeholders has 
accredited the success of counter-piracy efforts to the multiple actors involved
29
, 
and they have spoken about creative new solutions as a result from these operations, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
25
 Hofmann, 2008  
26
 Biermann in Hallenberg et al, 2009; Hofmann, 2008  
27
 It was stated in the first preparatory interview for this thesis that the understanding for how the EU and NATO 
have evolved will help to accept the complexity and bureaucratic processes. This understanding was necessary 
also to grasp the current operations at sea.  
28
 Bergh & Höijer, 2008  
29
 As was illustrated by the consensus in the debate held in May 2014, which is presented in the results part.  
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which could be applied on international cooperation. This creates a good starting 
point for this thesis
30
.   
 
While this theory has previously been used in economic analysis
31
, its main ideas 
are applicable to other fields of research. By applying the theoretical approach to the 
case of institutional competition in the realm of security, this study can also be seen 
as testing the explanatory capacity for the theory.  
 
The paper hypothesizes in accordance with these ideas that institutional competition 
can have positive outcomes. The following broader areas will be analyzed in the 
study:  
 
 Competition 
 Learning and experimentation 
 Transparency 
 New solutions 
 
The empirical data consists of interviews with representatives from various levels 
within the EU and NATO structures with experience from the operations on political 
and/or operational level. The interviews center on the themes above, with open-ended 
and neutral questions. With the respondents associating freely on these concepts, the 
intention was to find common standpoints and contrasting views, which could be 
contrasted to existing research as well as the theoretical framework in order to test its 
reliability.   
 
A debate on the topic Lessons Learnt from the Gulf of Aden Operations held in Brussels 
in the end phase of this study is also included as empirical data since the discussions 
came to centre on the issues examined in this paper. This panel debate was organized by 
a Brussels based think tank with expert speakers from the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM), the U.S. Mission to NATO, 
and the Department of Political Economy, King’s College London. The views 
represented from military, economic and political perspective were highly relevant for 
the aim of this paper and to contrast academic sources and the interviews
32
.     
 
In the preparatory stages for this thesis, two informal interviews were held in Brussels 
with general focus on EU and NATO cooperation. These were valuable in setting the 
focus and aim for the continued research for the paper. A visit to the Port of Fujairah in 
the United Arab Emirates and meetings with representatives from the shipping industry 
in January 2014 proved valuable to create an understanding for the industry’s point of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
30
 The success in countering piracy can be seen by the number of attacks by Somali pirates in 2011 (237) which 
dropped to only 2 reported cases from 2012-2014, according to Oceans Beyond Piracy. The other arguments 
come from the informal interviews conducted in the preparatory stages of this thesis as well as meetings with 
representatives from the shipping industry in Fujairah, in the UAE.  
31
 Which dates back to analyses made by philosophers David Hume, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant and 
beyond.  
32
 Security and Defence Agenda - A Neutral Platform for discussing defence and security policies,  
http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Functionalnavigation/Aboutus/tabid/1234/Default.aspx  
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view. These interactions were informal in nature only with the aim to grasp the context 
of issues regarding counter-piracy efforts. They are not presented in the analysis as 
empirical data since they were held without the informed consent and did not focus on 
the same issues as the interviews that were held at later stages
33
. 
 
An advantage of performing the preparatory interviews was that it allowed for finding 
relevant questions. It furthermore helped to identify research areas seen as relevant to 
the staff in the operations, which creates a link between the academic study and the 
institutions.  
 
Other sources used in the thesis are official documents from the European Union and 
NATO, academic journals and sources from independent research agencies
34
. 
2.1 Methodological Considerations  
 
 This thesis takes the approach that scientific research is about finding 
explanations and improving understanding for societal phenomena
35
. There are 
however different ways to create these explanations and improved understanding.   
 
Social science research commonly draws inspiration from the natural sciences and 
the quantitative methods for analysis with its emphasis on cause and effect, and 
generalization of results. While the aim of scientific research is to find 
generalizeable results, this does not necessarily eliminate the study the particulars 
by looking at few cases through the qualitative method. As has been argued by 
King, Keohane and Verba
36
:  
 
“The very purpose of moving from the particular to the general is our 
understanding of both”  
 
This argument illustrates the importance of creating a genuine understanding for 
the research area as a first step to generalize results which can be contrasted to the 
view from critics of the case study method who argue that studying few cases 
would be insufficient in order to establish reliability and reliability in findings
37
. 
 
Other scholars in favor of few empirical examples believe that focusing on the 
particulars in few examples can contribute to a greater understanding for the wider 
research area. It can also be argued that the case study method allows the 
researcher to examine the research problem from the outside and leads “within-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
33
 In addition, a visit to the operational headquarters in Northwood for the EU and NATO is scheduled on May 
30. Due to time constraints, this visit is scheduled after the hand in of the thesis but in time for the presentation 
of the study. This visit has the aim of an improved overall understanding of the research area, since the physical 
settings and interaction with “real people” can a dimension that cannot be found in the academic literature.    
34
 The non-profit organization Oceans Beyond Piracy has been an important source for accurate and relevant 
information on these issues.   
35
 Easaiasson et al. 2010 
36
 King, Keohane & Verba, in Esaiasson et al. 2010.  
37
 Ibid.  
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case explanations”.  
 
While this approach lacks a control situation, it gives a more thorough analysis on 
the empirical data. Another advantage of using a single case study method is the 
chance to conduct a more thorough literature review, which enables insights late 
in the research process that would not be possible with a large number of cases
38
.  
 
These factors have all been taken into consideration when structuring this thesis. 
In terms of foreign and security policy, situations are rapidly changing and 
institutions are affected by internal and external factors which makes it difficult to 
identify independent variables or control situations. The method has been 
carefully chosen by considering the dynamics of the EU and NATO relations, the 
complex and multifaceted operational theatre where the counter-piracy operations 
takes place, as well as its applicability and relevance to the theoretical framework.  
 
Despite the complex nature of the institutional characteristics, the results of this 
study could be generalizable in other cases of institutional competition between 
security providers also relating to the idea of changing dynamics of security 
cooperation, as described in Section 1.4 on existing studies on EU and NATO 
relations. 
2.2 The Interviews  
 
Two preparatory interviews were held in the early stages in of the research with 
military officials with operational experience from Atalanta and Operation Ocean 
Shield.  
 
Four interviews were then conducted in Brussels in May 2014. The respondents 
were chosen because of their experience from the counter-piracy operations but 
also for their individual expertise and for organizational level they were working 
on. The objective was to get as broad sample as possible, in order to enhance the 
reliability of the results
39
.  
 
To conduct more interviews would arguably have strengthened the reliability of 
the results, but since the findings were contrasted with academic sources as well 
as the preparatory interviews, it should be seen as sufficient. In addition, the 
choice to interview experts from within the organizations could raise questions in 
terms of bias, and though it could have been expected that the interviewees would 
speak in favor of their organization, this was not noted in the interviews.   
 
The interviews with NATO officials were conducted with two representatives at 
NATO’s political headquarters in Brussels. The first interview was conducted 
with a political official working for a NATO member state which has played a 
significant role in counter-piracy efforts. The second interview was conducted 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
38
 Gustavsson, 1998, p. 5-8   
39
 Esaiasson et al. 2010, p. 284-311  
  10 
with a military official with insight in the discussions preceding the establishing 
of Operation Ocean Shield. This respondent also had operational experience from 
missions where both the European Union and NATO had been operating.  
 
The other two interviews were conducted with officials in the EU structures with 
experience in Operation Atalanta. The first interview was held with a national 
representative at an EU delegation and the second with an official at the European 
External Action Service.   
 
The interviews were held in the offices of the respondents with informed 
consent
40
. Because the sensitivity of some of the issues, and the fact that the 
respondents gave their personal reflections on their organizations, their identities 
were kept anonymous. Due to security regulations, laptops, tape recorders and 
other electronic devices were not allowed in all buildings and therefore the 
interviews were documented by note-taking.   
 
While there are many advantages of tape recording interviews in terms of 
accuracy, quoting and for memory; recording the respondents in this environment 
could possibly have kept them from speaking as freely, and therefore it was also a 
choice to only take notes
41
.   
 
The interviews were semi-structured, informal and from between 45-60 minutes. 
While each interview included the themes of competition, learning and 
experimentation, transparency and solutions, the initial questions in each 
interview were of a more general kind, such as the coordination and cooperation 
between the EU and NATO at large, in order to see where this would lead the 
interview. The objective was to get the respondent to associate freely around the 
concepts
42
.  
 
The interview guides where individually designed to suit the respondent, relating 
to their work tasks and experience. For instance, interviews with representatives 
with operational experience evolved around these experiences, while 
representatives on political level were asked about questions relating to the 
political aspects. There were both general and more specific questions, and the 
idea was to use open-ended questions with the aim to find the “unexpected”, with 
the hopes of finding common standpoints, or contrasting views. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
40
 The respondents were given the information on the study, the procedure of the interview and that their 
identities would be kept anonymous in the text.   
41
 Easaiasson et al. p. 283-313 
42
 This idea is derived from the study of sociology and what is known as the “dream scenario” or “free 
conceptualization”.  
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2.3 Delimitations 
In order to conduct a comprehensive and accurate study in accordance with the 
outlined aim of the paper, delimitation is necessary. A wide number of actors are 
involved in the counter-piracy measures which go beyond the military operations. 
Counter-piracy measures are also taking place on various levels. While several 
EU officials have pointed out that Operation Atalanta should be seen as a “piece 
of a larger puzzle”43, a representative from a national delegation at NATO 
commented that the interaction between NATO and China, or NATO and Pakistan 
could be seen as just as relevant to examine as the EU and NATO relations in this 
case
44
. 
 
As this study aims to give a new perspective to the debate on EU and NATO 
relations, other aspects of the “bigger puzzle” of countering maritime piracy are 
excluded. It is worth to take into account that also within the EU and NATO, 
work takes place on different institutional levels. At NATO, there is a distinct 
division between the work that takes place on military and political level
45
, and in 
the European Union there are parallel initiatives with regards to counter-piracy 
under the authority of the European Commission and the European Council, 
which has made some researchers consider cases of “intra-institutional 
competition” within the organizations46.   
 
An important factor for security and defense cooperation is external political 
factors. One of the interviewees remarked that the current crisis in Europe’s 
immediate neighborhood has driven EU and NATO to closer communication and 
cooperation in their response to Russia
47
. External political factors could play a 
role with regards to the EU and NATO behaviors in military operations, but as it 
would not contribute to the aim of the study it is excluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
43
 Interview 1 
44
 Interview 2  
45
 Interview 1, NATO Handbook, Hofmann, 2007  
46
 Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013, p.31  
47
 Interview 1 
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2.4 Outline 
This thesis is made up by three parts. The first part has the introduction, methods 
and materials, the theoretical framework as well as a presentation of the research 
area. The second part of the thesis presents significant events that have shaped the 
establishment of institutional relations between the European Union and NATO in 
security and defense policy as well as their institutional design and resources. The 
third and final part presents the results and the conclusion. 
 
The following section will explain the theoretical framework, before giving the 
background to the international response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian 
Ocean. 
  13 
3 Theoretical Approach 
The theoretical framework for this study is drawn from the ideas presented by 
scholars Bergh and Höijer in their 2008 textbook “Institutional Competition - New 
Thinking in Political Economy”. Through a number of essays, the editors give a 
new perspective on the traditionally negative view on institutional competition. 
Instead of negative assessments, the authors argue that institutional competition 
can lead to learning effects and information effects, as well as experimentation 
and corrective forces.  
 
 According to the authors, analysis in the field have previously focused on 
negative effects from institutional competition, such as races to the bottom and 
“democratic deficits” as the competition would force politicians to prioritize 
international investments capital rather than working for their voters
48
. 
 
To challenge this negative view, the authors pose the question: 
 
“Why is it that competition between institutions is seen as something bad, 
when the lack of competition is seen as just as bad in standard analysis?
49”  
 
Consequently, they want to turn the above argument around and suggest that 
institutional competition can generate positive outcomes such as:  
 
- Institutional competition might facilitate democracy rather than inhibit it 
- Institutional competition might lead to learning processes through 
experimentation which might be beneficial for society 
- Institutional competition might act as a corrective force to reduce 
inefficiencies
50
 
 
The general idea is that competition leads to diversity and “friendly rivalry”, and 
that the competition between favorable institutional frameworks could lead to 
experimentation and act as a corrective force when the main institutions are 
compelled to adapt in order to better satisfy their constituents
51
.  
 
There is also an important mechanism stemming from competition, which is the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
48
 Bergh & Höijer, 2008, ix 
49
 Ibid.  
50
 Ibid. ix  
51
 Bergh and Höijer, 2008, p. 13  
  14 
ability to learn from competitors
52
. According to this view, competition should be 
seen as a discovery process. In relation to this is also the practice of 
experimentation, and to use “trial-and-error” in order to find the best solution to a 
specific problem. According to the theory, multiple actors involved will lead to 
increased diversity in measures and it will also hinder a single actor to be overly 
influential in decision-making processes. In this sense, institutional competition 
can also be linked to a democratic aspect
53
.  
 
Additionally, another argument related for institutional competition is that 
increased competition is likely to lead to institutional pluralism, which in turn 
could lead to competing institutional frameworks, as nations are expected to vote 
with their feet
54
.  
 
While the main ideas in this textbook are examined through an economic view, 
the authors acknowledge that institutions can be discussed in more general terms, 
and that the concept of institutional competition is applicable to studies of 
political units, foreign policy and military power. Moreover, Bergh and Höijer 
point out that institutional competition goes beyond the roles of governments, 
states and markets and is relevant when analyzing formal and informal 
institutions, as well as competition on various levels within societies and on 
global scale
55
.  
 
3.1 Institutional Competition in the Realm of 
Security 
Institutional competition is a composite phrase which can be defined in several 
ways but the general idea is that there are actors (or institutions) that offer a 
specific service, and that there are customers who are free to choose from these 
services. Institutions in this sense can relate to political units, markets, 
governments or even “system of behavioral rules, sanctions and the actors that 
enforce them”. An illustration of this definition is the state; since it creates the 
legal rules, imposes sanctions and appoints actors responsible of administrating 
these sanctions
56
. 
 
Institutional competition can also be defined as “the coordination of systems by 
institutions”. There is a distinction between two types of competition, namely 
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resource based competition and yardstick competition. While the first concept 
refers to competition over scare resources and where actors gets their share by 
denying the other actors theirs, yardstick competition is concerned with how 
competing institutions can learn from each other’s comparative success and 
failures, which introduces the idea of competition conducive to experimentation 
and learning
57
. In this thesis, both the EU and NATO are defined as institutions, 
but while this definition goes for NATO as whole, the European Union’s 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which is responsible of the 
Union’s security policies, is the “sub-institution” of the Union which will be 
contrasted with NATO in this paper.  
 
When applying this theoretical framework to the dimension of EU and NATO 
relations, institutional competition can be understood as the two institutions 
providing security services which the states with dual memberships can choose 
from. According to the theory this would make the institutions adapt their services 
in order to attract “customers”58, or in this case participation from states in 
military or crisis management operations.   
 
This case of competition in the realm of security has also been described by 
Biermann
59
, who argues that multiple security providers are competing for 
mandates, tasks and resources, both in Europe and globally
60
. The same line of 
reasoning suggests that security providers are likely to adapt to show their 
adequacy to handle specific threats. In the case of the European Union and 
NATO, Biermann claims that this can be seen as an institutional selection process 
for the European states that are members of both organizations
61
. Another scholar 
who has made the same distinction is Hofmann, who argues that the EU and 
NATO are overlapping institutions in three dimensions; common membership, 
intersecting mandate and shared resources
62
.   
 
Some researchers have also claimed that there might be a case of intra-
institutional competition within the European Union institutions where there are 
numbers of programs runs by various EU institutions make coordination 
difficult,
63
 which could lead to a lack of transparency. For both the European 
Union and NATO in military operations “costs lie where they fall”, which means 
that the operations and military assets are funded and provided by the 
participating states, and not by a joint budget
64
. In general terms, this gives the 
member states of both organizations a choice between EU and NATO in security 
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policy, creating an incentive for “competition over favorable institutional 
frameworks” in operations where both EU and NATO are engage. Moreover, it 
can be viewed as a competition for military assets which are in the same national 
pool of resources
65
. 
 
The main ideas from Bergh and Höijer’s with regards to democracy, learning and 
experimentation, and whether competition can act as a corrective force have been 
applied to the research area slightly amended.  For instance, democracy in the 
theoretical framework can be linked to openness to constituents
66
. When applied 
to the research area, transparency and information-sharing have been used as a 
measure of democracy, and the aspect of a corrective force is linked to creating 
new solutions. 
3.2 Application of the Theoretical Framework 
The main ideas from the theoretical framework have been used to create the 
interview guide. With open-ended questions, the interviews have focused on the 
themes of competition, learning and experimenting, transparency and solutions. 
By letting the interviewees give their own associations to these concepts, common 
grounds could be identified as result, and these will be presented in the third part 
of this thesis. 
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4 The International Response to Piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean 
Maritime piracy was put on the global security agenda after a number of brutal 
attacks on commercial shipping vessels off the coast of Somalia in the early 
2000s
67
. The rise of Somali piracy can be seen a directly linked to the collapse of 
the Somali political system which had been reality since a coup d’état in 1991 and 
the collapse of the Siad Barre government
68
. The piracy business evolved into a 
lucrative alternative for Somalis suffering from poverty, and the absence of 
functioning state structures let the industry evolve almost unimpeded
69
.  
 
The international response to the piracy off the Somali coast came after United 
Nations (UN) General Secretary Ban Ki-moon had urged the international 
community to escort the UN World Food Program (WFP) ships through the 
dangerous waters off the Somali coast. The initial response was ad hoc, with 
French, Danish and Canadian vessels answering the UN request
70
. Their duties 
were later taken over by a NATO operation in 2008, which was followed by the 
European Union and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) taskforce 151 (CTF-
151) in 2009. The presence of the navies was encouraged by representatives from 
the shipping industry, and several coordination mechanisms were established as 
well as the creation of non-governmental organizations mainly concerned with the 
safety of seafarers
71
.   
 
The three naval coalition led by the European Union, NATO and the Combined 
Maritime Forces are currently operating the area with independently deployed 
ships from various states. The area of operation covers around 2,000,000 nautical 
miles, which equals 3,700,000 square kilometers
72
. The coalitions also patrol the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Route (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden, which is 
an established shipping route in the High Risk Area (HRA) where commercial 
vessels are escorted in convoys after registering to the Maritime Security Centre 
Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) in the United Kingdom.  
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Also states such as Pakistan, China, Russian, India, Iran and Japan have deployed 
independent warships to escort commercial shipping vessels under their national 
flag. The navies work closely together and they are also in close communication 
and coordination with the regional states such as Oman, the United Arab Emirates 
and Kenya. On any given day, around twenty to thirty warships patrol the High 
Risk Area off the Horn of Somalia
73
.  
 
Although maritime piracy is nothing new or exclusive to Somali waters, the 
perception of the threat it posed to world trade explains the proportion of the 
response by the international community to counter piracy. It is estimated that 90 
% of world trade is transported by sea and approximately 30 % of the shipping 
goods measured by value is transported through the Gulf of Aden each year
74
. 
Around 22,000 commercial vessels cross the Gulf of Aden annually toward global 
choke points Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mendeb passage from the Arabian Sea to the 
Red Sea and the Hormuz Strait between Oman and Iran
75
.  
 
There have been questions relating to the scope and proportion of the counter-
piracy efforts by the international community and one researcher pointed out that: 
 
“The idea of NATO using the world’s most advanced warships to combat 
Kalashnikov striped teenagers in skiffs would have seen laughable to the 
founding fathers of NATO”76. 
 
However, if one looks at the economic costs on regional and the world economy, 
the counter-piracy efforts are seen as proactive and cost-efficient
77
. And as an  
official from NATO’s International Military Staff (IMS) pointed out with regards 
to the above quote, the reason why NATO uses the world’s most advanced 
warships to combat pirates is simply because “you use what you have”78. 
 
Representatives from the industry and the navies have also pointed to the brutal 
methods used by pirates such as the common practice of holding seafarers hostage 
for long periods of time for ransom money, which has evolved to a piracy 
business model. Without functional state institutions, pirates have been able to 
keep hostages for periods up to two years and negotiating increased ransoms
79
.   
 
Another motivation behind the response to piracy is the importance for the 
international community and individual states with significant interest in the 
maritime sector to safeguard the sea lines of communications and the freedom of 
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the seas, outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS) as one of the world’s universal laws80.  
 
The naval response to tackle Somali piracy has evolved since the pirates started to 
change tactics
81
. Initially, the attacks occurred in the geographical area of the Gulf 
of Aden and off the Somali coastline, but the pirates started using hijacked ships 
as motherships from where they could embark their skiffs. After this gradual 
tactical shift by the pirates, attacks were reported as south as Mozambique and as 
far east as the Indian coast. As the pirates shifted tactics, the navies followed 
further out in the seas
82
. 
 
While the number of reported pirate attacks peaked in 2011 with 237 attacks 
on ships and 28 successful hijackings
83
, there has to date only been two successful 
attacks since May 2012
84
. The success of counter-piracy efforts have been 
accredited the naval forces and their deterring presence, as well as proactive 
measures from the shipping industry which can be found in the Best Management 
Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4). These practices 
include increased transit speeds in the High Risk Area, the use of citadels or safe 
rooms and barbwire to hinder pirates from boarding the ships.  
 
The increased use of private armed security onboard ships can also explain the 
drop in reported attacks which so far is said to have had a 100 % success rate
85
. 
Researchers from independent non-profit organization Oceans Beyond Piracy 
express concerns that the decreased perception of threat is making mariners steer 
away from the practices in the BMP, in order to reduce costs, and furthermore that 
they fail to report attacks
86
. 
 
There is a strong consensus among stakeholders from navies and industry that the 
use of military force can only tackle the symptoms of problem and the real 
solution to end Somali piracy must deal with the causes and not only the 
symptoms
87
. The current mandates of the EU and NATO naval operations will 
end in December 2014, and they are most likely to be extended until 2016 since 
there is also consensus that despite the drop of number of attacks, the real solution 
to Somali piracy remains ashore. According to stakeholders, the operations are 
ready for the “next phase” and finding an exit strategy for the military operations, 
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and establishing rule of law in Somalia – a process which should be owned by 
Somalia
88
. 
4.1 The Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean  
While economic motivations provide good explanations to the international 
community’s engagement in counter-piracy efforts, the participating states 
represent a wide number of different interests and several of them are conducting 
measures on different levels. States have participated in one, two or all three naval 
coalitions while they have simultaneously created development aid programs for 
capacity building in Somalia
89
.  
 
There is also a technological imperative which can be viewed as an added value to 
the operations. By participating in the missions, states get a chance to test their 
technology, as well as conducting reconnaissance and surveillance. Participation 
in the operations also allows training interoperability with regional actors. As the 
regional navies from Pakistan, India and Oman are maturing, Western traditional 
navies, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, see it as 
valuable for building and maintaining relations with these states, partially through 
port visits and by conducting joint exercises. These new relationships can also be 
seen as arms sales opportunities with the regional actors
90
.  
 
The traditional Western naval powers are forming closer relationships with 
regional actors such as the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar. These states 
keep a significant presence in the region, both ashore and at sea, which can be 
described by national interests in resources and regional security presence
91
. 
Keeping influence and presence at sea can be seen as strategic since it allows for 
power projection and independence from sovereignty restrictions
92
.  
 
There is also imperative to keep presence in the region in order to secure energy. 
The maritime area which between the Horn of Africa and the Indian Peninsula 
gives access to the Hormuz Strait and Persian Gulf which is vital for the world’s 
energy security. This is illustrated by the CMF which has a specific task only 
focused with safeguarding energy security. Furthermore, The United States 
presence in the region can also be linked to the maintenance of stability in the 
wider Middle East the North African region. The CMF has also issue-specific task 
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forces with responsibilities ranging from the protection of Iraqi oil terminals to 
providing aircraft carriers ready to respond in the case of chemical attacks in 
Syria; and for deploying aircrafts to the United States military operation in 
Afghanistan
93
. This very much illustrates the strategic importance of the Indian 
Ocean and why states choose to keep maritime presence.  
4.2 The Naval Operations and Their Mandates 
A more thorough description of the naval operations will be presented in 
Chapter 8 of this thesis and this section should be seen as a brief background in 
light of the international response to counter piracy. 
 
NATO’s presence in the Gulf of Aden can be viewed as part of the Alliance’s 
ambition to maintain the naval interoperability gained from the counter-terrorism 
mission Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), in 2001, and the Libya intervention 
Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in 2010 which were both conducted in the 
Mediterranean Sea
94
. After the European Union established its operation Atalanta 
it also launched a simultaneous civil mission (with military expertise) in the Horn 
of Africa. The civil mission, EUCAP NESTOR focuses on capacity building, such 
as assisting the development of a Somali coast guard. The two missions can be 
seen as examples of the European Union’s comprehensive approach in 
engagement with third states, which in this sense aims at bringing together civil 
and military CSDP by multifaceted efforts
95
. While the EU has experience in 
post-crisis management, this is relatively new ground to NATO which is stated in 
its Strategic Concept from 2010 that a comprehensive political civilian and 
military approach is necessary for efficient crisis management
96
 
 
While the naval coalitions to some extent overlap in terms of area of operation, 
participating states and mandates, there are also differences. The mandate for 
Operation Atalanta has developed from deterrence and disruption to include aerial 
strikes on pirate camps, and while NATO has mandate to monitor beach camps, 
the Alliance cannot engage on Somali land territory, and it lacks the bilateral 
agreements with regional states such as Kenya and the Seychelles for extradition 
and judicial trials after capturing suspected pirates
97
.  
 
One researcher notes that members of both organizations are more likely to insert 
ships to the EU mission since it is better resourced, which is an option not open 
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for states such as Turkey and Denmark which has an “opt-out referendum” related 
to the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy, which in practice 
means that it does not participate in military operations conducted by the 
European Union
98
.  
 
Currently, the European Union and NATO are discussing the extension of 
mandates for the missions, and both organizations are developing new maritime 
security strategies expected to be finalized in 2014. While the decision on 
mandate is conducted on political level by consensus of 28 member states for both 
organizations, the force generation is made by the individual states and there are 
indications that the perceived threat reduction of piracy has made force 
generation, or troop contribution difficult
99
. 
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5 PART II 
 
 
This section outlines the background to some of the significant events that have 
shaped the establishment of institutional relations between the European Union 
and NATO from the end of the Cold War until the Lisbon Treaty and today. 
5.1 EU and NATO – The Establishment of 
Institutional Relations  
 
   The European Union and NATO existed as two parallel organizations without 
formal relations for almost forty years
100
. Since the establishment of a common 
security and defense policy within the European Union, attempts have been made 
to create formal institutional relations where the EU and NATO should 
complement each other with their capabilities and expertise
101
. While one could 
argue that the first attempts to establish institutional relations were made much 
sooner, the Cold War will be used as a starting point in this thesis since this can be 
seen as the common denominator to start the rapid transformation processes of 
both the EU and NATO.   
 
Two major events in the 1990s that particularly came to shape the direction of the 
European Union and NATO were the end of the Cold War and the perennial 
problems in the Western Balkans
102
. The end of the Cold War allowed for the 
European Union and NATO to expand towards former communist states in 
Eastern and Central Europe, and it also enabled the neutral western European 
states Austria, Finland and Sweden to join the EU in 1995 and NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994.  
 
The dismantling of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order had 
left NATO without a clear purpose, and many scholars had predicted that the 
Alliance would demise or disappear
103
. Instead NATO recognized the need for 
transformation and started a process that is still ongoing today, with an aim 
towards managing a broader set of security related tasks, set out in the Alliance’s 
new strategic concept from 1991
104
. Hereby, NATO shifted focus from military 
deterrence towards the added value of security provider by diplomatic means as 
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well and the ambition to act as a “multi-purpose alliance”. This new direction of 
NATO focused on conflict prevention through diplomatic means, crisis 
management and partnership programs
105
. 
Perhaps the most remarkable transformation after the Cold War was the European 
Community’s change from an economic integration power towards a Union 
aiming to speak with one voice in a number of policy areas
106
. With the 
enlargement rounds in 1995, 2004 and 2007, it more than doubled its population 
and carried out rounds of institutional reform through the adoption of new treaties. 
 
The outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia and the EU’s inability to intervene in its 
immediate neighborhood can be said to be the ultimate push for the creation of a 
European security and defense policy, independent from NATO
107
. Moreover, 
NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 demonstrated the gap between 
the European capabilities and those of the United States, and it also divided states 
that were members of both organizations in terms of which organization that 
should be the main security provider of Europe
108
.  
 
The 1990s and the transformation of both organizations saw many examples of a 
Europeanist camp which wanted to see the European Union as lead organizations 
for security and defense issues, emancipated from American influence, and a  
“transatlantic” camp that lobbied for the EU developing capabilities only to 
complement existing NATO structures
109
. 
 
There had been previous efforts to create a security policy in Europe, such as the 
early establishment of a European Defence Community which later evolved into 
the Western European Union (WEU) in the 1950s. The WEU was a transatlantic 
defense union comprised by the United States and Western European states. Some 
of its institutional characteristics and tasks were later used as a basis for the 
creation of a new European Security architecture which was to evolve after the 
Cold War, such as the Petersberg tasks
110
. These were later integrated into the 
European Union treaties such as the Amsterdam Treaty, the Treaty of Nice and 
ultimately, the Treaty of Lisbon
111
.  
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5.2 The WEU and the ESDI 
 
With NATO’s new strategic concept from 1991, the Alliance had 
acknowledged the need to adapt to a new and more promising era in Europe
112
. 
The Alliance choose to some researcher’s surprise, to keep its backbone on 
collective defense as is outlined in Article V, but added new commitments by 
taking on non-military tasks as well
113
. At the same time, the European Union 
(then the European Community) had incorporated the Petersburg tasks under the 
authority of the Western European Union, which outlined possible military 
operations. 
 
As the two organizations were moving towards managing the similar kind of 
tasks in terms of security and defense, there were also attempts to have a common 
security policy under NATO lead. When the WEU was made lead organization 
for all European-led military crisis operations this was supported by particularly 
France who wanted to counter balance the American influence in NATO
114
. 
According to this view, the European Union should develop its own planning and 
operational capabilities in security and defense and also capable for autonomous 
action, as opposed to being dependent on NATO capabilities. The contrasting 
view from others, such as the United Kingdom and the United States sought to 
establish a European Security pillar which would develop under NATO lead.  
 
While there were still uncertainties about the future role and influence of the 
United States in the post-Cold War Europe, the transatlantic argument was that 
European capabilities should be seen as a complement to the existing NATO 
structures. These contrasting views reached a compromise in Brussels in 1994 
where the European security pillar under NATO was recognized as a “European 
Security and Defence Identity”, or the ESDI. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
meetings in Berlin in 1996 further established that the activation of the ESDI 
should be supported by military and political structures of NATO. And while the 
Western European Union would be the lead-organization in European crisis 
management operations, the ESDI activation was rationalized as “separable but 
not separate military capabilities in operations led by the Western European 
Union”115. 
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5.3 The Saint Malo Declaration and the ESDP 
The Saint Malo summit held in France in 1998 marked the end of the WEU as a 
lead organization and gave green light for a new compromise. The French and 
British Heads of State and Government jointly declared in that Europe must have 
capacity for autonomous action while also stating that:  
 
“The European Union would be contributing to the vitality of a modernized 
Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defense of its 
members”.  
 
and thereby retaining its commitment to NATO and its transatlantic commitment 
not to duplicate existing NATO structures
116
.  
 
The Saint Malo declaration marked the shift from the attempts to create a 
transatlantic European Defence and Security Identity, towards the first attempts to 
establish the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was 
independent from NATO. The ESDP was given its legal basis through the 
ratification of the Treaty of Nice in 2001, and later had its task transferred to the 
Common Security and Defence Policy in the Treaty of Lisbon 2009.   
 
While some European capitals had been concerned that the creation of the ESDP 
would replicate NATO in terms of structure, policy and procedures
117
, others, 
most notably the United Kingdom had argued for the ESDP to function as a 
European compliment to existing transatlantic capabilities. France and other 
European states, had on the other hand lobbied for the rationalization of the ESDP 
as Europe’s primary security tool, free from American influence118.  
 
This shift in policy from the ESDI to the ESDP was concretized in 1999, with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam coming into force and the European Council Declaration on 
Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, where it 
was stated that the EU requires the capability for autonomous action for the 
purpose of executing the Petersberg tasks in civil and crisis management 
operations
119
. This enabled for the formal transfer of tasks from the WEU to the 
EU, and this shift in policy was also noted in NATO’s Washington Summit the 
same year, where the Alliance acknowledged:  
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“the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action 
so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a 
whole is not engaged”120. 
 
The European Council meeting in Cologne and the establishment of the ESDP 
marks where the European Union for the first time can be seen as a key security 
actor
121
, and this is where institutional relations between NATO and the new 
ESDP body could actually start evolve. 
5.4 Berlin Plus 
One scholar notes that while the ESDP could have taken many forms, it used 
NATO’s structures as a template122. The main institutions of the ESDP were the 
Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU 
Military staff, which can be contrasted with the North Atlantic Council (NAC), 
the Military Committee and the International Military Staff (IMS)
123
.  
 
In 2000, the first NAC-PSC meeting was held to discuss foreign and security 
matters. In 2001, the EU and NATO made joint statements on the developments 
in the Western Balkans through its “Concerted Approach for the Western 
Balkans” and they also conducted a joint crisis management exercise124.  
 
In 2002 the Berlin Plus arrangements, which had been initiated in 1996 were 
finalized, allowing for the EU to use NATO planning capabilities on case-by-case 
in the event of a EU-led crisis management operation. The Berlin Plus 
arrangements de facto mean that EU-led operations could be planned and 
executed from NATO’s operational headquarters in Belgium125.   
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5.5 The Lisbon Treaty and NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept 
The European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as we know it 
today entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, when it replaced the 
ESDP. The creation of the Lisbon Treaty has had great significance for the 
structuring and coordination of EU’s military capabilities. Lisbon paved way for 
the establishment of the European External Action Services (EEAS) with the 
appointment of a High Representative and Vice President to speak for the Union 
in foreign affairs
126
. 
 
In conjunction to this, NATO had adopted its new strategic concept at the 
Lisbon Summit in 2010, where it declared its strategic partnership with the EU, 
making a reference to the Union as a “unique and essential partner to NATO for 
the overall security in the Euro-Atlantic area”127. In the strategic concept, the 
Alliance called for strengthened transparency and enhanced practical cooperation 
between the EU and NATO, from coordination, to planning and mutual support in 
the field
128
.   
 
The institutional changes following the Treaty of Lisbon and NATO’s New 
Strategic Concept will be further explained in Chapter 6 and 7, and in Chapter 8 
of the thesis which deals with the coordination of the missions. 
5.6 Cooperation in the field 
Since the establishment of the ESDP and CSDP, the European Union has engaged 
in a number of operational theatres such as Sahel in Niger, South Sudan, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Somalia. The EU missions have most commonly been mandated 
to perform civil crisis tasks, rule of law missions and police missions. Examples 
of these are the EUPOL Afghanistan, and EULEX in Kosovo, where the EU 
performs civil policing tasks such as assisting in the reforms and development of 
the police sector
129
.  
 
When looking at EU and NATO interaction in the field, one can distinguish 
between ways for this cooperation. There are the formal Berlin Plus operations 
such as ALTHEA and CONCORDIA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, 
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non-agreed framework missions where they are in the same operational theatre 
performing different functions, such as in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and lastly 
there are operations where the EU and NATO are operating the same geographical 
area, performing similar tasks without formal arrangement for cooperation, as is 
the case with Operation Atalanta and Operation Ocean Shield
130
.  
 
Cooperation on ground level is said to be working well and this goes for both 
informal cooperation and formalized cooperation through the Berlin Plus 
arrangements where the EU uses NATO command and planning structures. 
Despite the apparent success of operations under Berlin Plus, one EU official 
claims that it is unlikely that we will see operations of this kind again until the 
political impasses have been resolved
131
. In relation to this, when asked why the 
EU and NATO should cooperate, NATO official replied that failure to 
communicate and cooperate means risking the lives of civilians as well as staff 
from both organizations
132
.  
 
While the Berlin Plus arrangement refers to the EU using NATO’s military 
capabilities, one scholar pointed out that there is also a case of “Berlin Plus in 
reverse” in operations where both EU and NATO are engaged. This relates to how 
NATO could use the European Union’s knowledge and expertise in civil crises 
management, which is an area new to NATO.  
5.7 The Participation Problem 
At first glance, the direct link between the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey 
might not be easy to spot, but this political impasse can be seen as one of the most 
important factors to the explain the political deadlock between the European 
Union and NATO on political level. This deadlock relates to how the EU member 
state Cyprus and NATO member state Turkey allegedly use their single 
membership to block formal cooperation between the EU and NATO, and this has 
impact on information sharing and meeting formats
133
.   
 
This political impasse which has been referred to the participation problem relates 
to how the EU has decided that it will not discuss issues which have security 
implications without all member states present. When the Berlin Plus 
arrangements were finalized in 2002, it was decided as a compromise that Cyprus 
would not take part in operations where the EU uses NATO capabilities, hence 
Cyprus was excluded from Berlin Plus arrangements. Formal meetings between 
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the EU and NATO could therefore take place without Cyprus, but this de facto led 
to what could be seen as a “strait jacket” for cooperation since formal EU and 
NATO meetings could not discuss any other issues than those under the Berlin 
Plus framework since Turkey did not want to share sensitive information relating 
to security and defense with non-NATO members
134
.   
 
An example of the implications this has had for EU and NATO cooperation was 
the NAC-PSC meeting in 2008 after Kosovo had declared independency. Despite 
the huge significant this had for the European Union and NATO’s engagement in 
the Western Balkans, this meeting format could not discuss anything other than 
operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina
135
.  
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6 Institutional Design of the CSDP 
Following the background on the establishment of EU and NATO institutional 
relations, this section will describe the existing structures of the European Union’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy. This section is followed by a more 
thorough presentation of Operation Atalanta and Operation Ocean Shield as well 
as the coordination mechanisms for the counter-piracy missions. 
 
Since the following section has described the processes of establishing relations 
between the EU and NATO, this section describes the current design of the 
institutions which is valuable to understand how cooperation could take place.   
 
The European Union Common Security and Defence Policy of today is only five 
years old and created by the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009
136
. Its 
structures are under the authority of the European Council where decision-making 
is made unanimously. A decision regarding the Union’s political and security 
issues are prepared by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and presented 
to the European Council while the overall work is prepared by the Permanent 
Representative Committee (COREPER). 
 
The Political and Security Committee is a permanent body created to act as the 
focal point for the Union’s international relations and it is comprised by 28 
national representatives who are under the authority of the High Representative. 
Furthermore, the PSC acts to prepare a consistent EU response in crisis, and the 
representatives convene several times a week to discuss all issues which might 
have implications on the Union’s foreign policy137. 
 
Since 2000 there have been recurrent PSC-NAC meetings, which are the highest 
level of cooperation between the EU and NATO. These meetings are held 
bimonthly and it is stated in EU legislation that the PSC should play a major role 
in consultations with NATO. Furthermore, the functions of the PSC is to exercise 
“political control and strategic direction” of the EU’s military response to a crisis, 
and it is the Political Security Committee that after consultation with the European 
Union Military Committee evaluates the strategic military options, including the 
chain of command, operation concept and operation plan which is forwarded to 
the Council for a formal decision. This is processed within the European External 
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Action Service, which in function is autonomous from other EU bodies and works 
in accordance with existing EU policies
138
. 
 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) was officially established in 2011 
as an autonomous body of the European Union and its mandate is to assist the 
High Representative and Vice President (HR/VP) in foreign affairs. It was created 
as the Union’s “diplomatic arm” to the world, and it should make sure that there is 
consistency and coordination in the EU’s foreign affairs139. 
 
The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVKOM) is a 
parallel institution to the EUMC, which provides advice and expertise to the PSC 
on civil crisis management aspects. The CIVKOM develops lessons learned; best 
management practices and helps to improve coordination of EU resources
140
.  
 
In order to overcome the civil and military division of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) was 
established. It is in the CMPD’s mandate to plan both civilian and military 
operations.  In addition there is a, Civil Planning and Conduct Capability 
(CPCC), which was established by the Council in 2007 in order to conduct the 
planning of civil operations, which can be seen as the equivalent of a civilian 
operational headquarters
141
.  
 
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military forum 
within the Union and it consists of the member states’ Chiefs of Defense 
(CHODs) who meet twice a year to discuss EU defense matters in Brussels. The 
Chiefs of Defense are also represented by the national permanent military 
representatives (MILREPs) in the Military Committee in meeting formats 
throughout the year. NATO has equivalent structures with its International 
Military Staff (IMS), and informal cooperation on these levels are said to be 
working well
142
. 
 
An important mechanism which could possibly enhance relations between the 
European Union and NATO is the appointment of the Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (DSACEUR) who is the second highest commander in 
Europe after NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The 
SACEUR and the DSACEUR both work from NATO’s operational headquarters, 
SHAPE in Mons, Belgium and while the appointed SACEUR is an American 
general, the DSACEUR is European and with allegiance to the European Union 
and to NATO. One researcher argues that the strategic role of the DSACEUR has 
been understated in the literature, and that the real cooperation between the 
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European Union and NATO takes place through this very office and the EU cell 
which is located in the SHAPE headquarters
143
. 
 
The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) was created as a result of the Treaty 
of Nice where it was decided that permanent political and military structures in 
the European Union should be established. With the implementation of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the EUMS came under the authority of the CSDP to provide military 
expertise and support. On the one hand, the EUMS is directly under the authority 
of the High Representative but on the other hand, it operates under the direction of 
the EUMC, and thus creates a direct link between the Armed Forces of the 
member states and the European Council
144
. 
6.1 Costs Lie Where They Fall 
When it comes to funding and resources for military operations conducted by the 
European Union, “costs lie where they fall”. This means that after a political 
decision has been made to launch an operation, it is the member states that 
contribute with resources to the mission except in the cases which are funded by 
the ATHENA mechanism, which covers costs such as transport, infrastructure and 
medical services
145
. While this is the case for the strict military operations, the 
civilian missions such as the EUCAP NESTOR are funded by the joint European 
Commission budget, which gives them larger budgets.  Some researchers have 
hypothesized about “strategic policy shaping” due to these financial arrangements. 
And furthermore, others with insight in the EU structures believe that the 
launching of a civil mission “with military expertise” but not purely military was 
financially motivated. This can also be linked to the apparent difficulty in getting 
member states to contribute with resources once the actual decision to launch an 
operation has been done, and there have been implications that the many different 
initiatives by two separate EU bodies could also lead to cases of “intra-
institutional competition”146.     
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6.2 Operational Headquarters 
 
The European Union does not have permanent headquarters and this has been 
debated by those who believe a permanent headquarters would duplicate existing 
NATO structures, and other who argue that the lack of “robust” command 
structures could be problematic for its future military operations
147
.  
 
Through the Berlin Plus arrangements the EU can use NATO’s planning 
capabilities which are located in Mons, Belgium. Since the arrangements were 
finalized, there is an integrated EU cell located in these headquarters and the 
DSACEUR at NATO’s headquarters is double-hatted148, and works for the EU 
and NATO. The EU can use the naval headquarters in Northwood, London, where 
also NATO Maritime Command is located.  In addition, the European Union can 
use the EU Operations Center (EU OPCEN) in Brussels, or chose between four 
national headquarters in France, Italy, Germany and Greece. After an operational 
headquarters has been nominated to the European Council, the operational 
headquarters appoints the force headquarters, which commands the ground 
operations. 
 
The question of a permanent headquarters has been discussed among the EU 
member states. The strongest opponent of a permanent EU headquarters is the 
United Kingdom which claims that it could rival NATO commands, or duplicate 
its existing command structures which would ultimately lead to unnecessary costs. 
France on the other hand has argued that the establishment of a permanent OHQ 
would facilitate the Union’s overall progress for defense efforts149. 
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7 Institutional Design of NATO 
NATO is commonly mistaken for being a pure military alliance. A more 
accurate description would be a political-military organization, since the decisions 
are made on political level, and the military staff is there to advice, assist the 
political body, and to create the operational plan for missions. Similar to the 
European Union CSDP structures, NATO has a military staff, national 
delegations, and a political council, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprised 
by the 28 ambassadors which is the Alliance’s highest decision-making body. 
Decisions are made by consensus by the 28 member states, and after a decision 
with military implications has been made in the NAC, it is passed to the military 
structures
150
. 
 
The national delegations at NATO’s political headquarters are comprised by 
national representatives appointed by their capitals to represent their national 
security interests. An important institutional change after the Cold War was the 
increased cooperation with non-NATO states through partnership programs
151
 and 
increased international dialogue. While partner countries can participate in some 
meetings, they do not take part in decision-making
152
.   
 
NATO’s international staff (IS) consists of around 1200 civilian personnel and 
are recruited by NATO or appointed by their respective government. Their 
primary task is to assist the national delegations and they are under the authority 
of the Secretary General
153
. 
 
NATO’s military operational command structure has three tiers operating on 
strategic, operational and tactic level. After NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010, the 
Alliance decided to “flatten” its military structure in order to cope with shrinking 
defense budgets of the member states. On strategic level there are two commands, 
the Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT).  
 
While ACO is located in the headquarters of Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE), ACT is located in Norfolk in the United States.  
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NATO’s International Military Staff (IMS) works closely with the International 
Staff and they are based in the same headquarters in Brussels. The international 
military staff is headed by a general at level of three stars or flag officer and their 
area of work is divided in divisions of plans and policy, operations, intelligence, 
co-operation and regional security, logistics, armament and resources. The IMS 
functions as the link between the political decision-making body and NATO’s 
strategic military commanders SACEUR and SACT, with offices at SHAPE in 
Mons, Belgium and Brunssum, the Netherlands
154
. 
 
NATO’s Military Committee, which could be seen as the equivalent of the 
EUMC, precedes its counter-part by four decades and has been a standing meeting 
format since NATO’s establishment in 1949. It meets frequently throughout the 
year with national military representatives, and three times a year with national 
Chiefs of Defense. The Military Committee provides consensus based advice to 
NAC with regards to military policies and strategies.  
 
With the 2011 New Strategic Concept, NATO also introduced a new civil and 
crisis emergency through the comprehensive approach (similar to the one of the as 
the EU). In its Strategic Concept, NATO states that by comprehensive approach it 
means to “combine the use of broad range of tools and greater interaction 
between international organizations, non-government organizations, civilian 
experts and military actors”. The Alliance also committed to implement UN 
resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and in all NATO-led military 
operations and missions
155
. 
 
The transformation of NATO’s structures and areas of operation show how 
NATO is taking on a new role where it is engaging with new actors and in more 
policy areas
156
. The reform of the military structures to become “leaner” also 
mirrors the austerity which its member states are facing in terms of defense 
budgets. Also the funding of NATO military operations go under the principle of 
“costs lie where they fall”, and since this is also the case for the European Union, 
the organizations are funded and equipped by the same pool of national resources. 
 
In terms of funding, NATO has three budgets that go under the common funding 
arrangements; the civil budget, the military budget and the NATO Security 
Investment Programme. These budgets cover Alliance command structures, 
communications systems and responsibilities that go beyond the responsibilities 
of any single members
157
. 
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While the previous sections have reiterated how a Europeanist camp has aimed to 
“emancipate” itself from American influence in the European security sector, the 
United States has recently started to shift focus from Europe towards strategic 
interests in South East Asia. Officials from the United States have also publically 
expressed that it is time for Europe to start taking responsibility of its own 
security, since the United States currently contributes to the largest part, 73 %, of 
NATO’s common budget158.  
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8 Coordination of the Operations 
This section puts Operation Atalanta and Operation Ocean Shield in a context by 
describing their inception and where they are today. This section then continues to 
describe the coordination mechanisms of the counter-piracy efforts, which have 
been developed by navies and industry. This creates improved understanding for 
the larger picture of the counter-piracy measures, and also illustrates the 
multifaceted approach of coordination that is taking place on different levels.  
8.1 Background 
The first response to Somali piracy was on national initatives with individual 
states escorting their national ships through the Gulf of Aden after an increased 
number of attacks on commercial vessels and the UN World Food Program ships. 
These efforts were formalized as NATO’s Operation Allied Provider was 
established from October-December 2008 until the EU Operation Atalanta was 
launched in December 2008 to take over these tasks. From March-August 2009, 
NATO conducted parallel operations to Atalanta with its Operation Allied 
Protector which was later replaced by Operation Ocean Shield which was 
comprised by the same actual naval force but with a more robust mandate
159
. 
 
During the early stages of these parallel operations, the intention was to have 
strategic planning conducted jointly by the EU and NATO, and there were 
recurrent briefings for NATO staff on the progress of Atalanta from the EU in 
order to show transparency
160
. During these early stages, NATO’s launching of its 
own counter-piracy operation was not given. In spring 2009, NATO’s Standing 
Naval Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) employed in the Eastern Atlantic area was 
deployed to conduct port visits to Singapore and Australia. As piracy activities at 
the time were increasing in the Gulf of Aden, these port visits were cancelled and 
the NATO forces stayed in the Gulf of Aden to conduct counter-piracy 
measures
161
.  
 
As these responsibilities were transferred to the Standing Naval Maritime Group 2 
(SNMG2), consisting of frigates from Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom 
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and the United States; Operation Ocean Shield was launched partially due to 
Turkey speaking for the need of NATO’s own counter-piracy operation. The 
SNMG2 constellation was the same used for the first rotation of Operation Ocean 
Shield from August 2009
162
. 
 
Both the EU and NATO have had transformation in their institutional 
organization and military structures since then. With the implementation of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union transferred tasks relating to security and 
defense matters to the recently established CSDP. Following the launching of 
Operation Atalanta were the creations of the European Union Training Mission 
(EUTM) Somalia, and EUCAP NESTOR, which were also under the CSDP 
framework. Officials within the EU point out that these missions are still in their 
early stages and in process of development
163
.  
 
While new initiatives are being developed in Brussels, coordination mechanisms 
are created by seafarers in the actual operational area to enhance cooperation and 
information sharing between the relevant stakeholders and this goes beyond the 
European Union and NATO
164
. Hence, several initiatives are being developed 
simultaneously at different levels. 
8.2 Operation Atalanta 
Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta was launched as European Union’s first naval 
operation in 2008. The mandate for Operation Atalanta has evolved from 
protection of vessels to an extended operational area that also includes Somali 
land territory and the Somali internal waters. Its operational area has also 
expanded beyond the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast to include areas of the 
Southern Red Sea and a large part of the Indian Ocean. The operational area 
currently covers an area of 2,000,000 square nautical miles, or 3,700,000 square 
kilometers
165
.  
 
The operational lead rotates between the participating states on four month basis 
and the number of vessels deployed depends on the monsoon period where piracy 
activity is low. On a typical rotation there are 4-7 Surface Combat Vessels, 1-2 
supporting ships, and also 2-4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft 
(MPRA) and approximately 1,200 personnel. The warships and aircrafts use the 
port of Djibouti as well as the French Djibouti Air Base through bilateral 
agreements with the EU. The EU has also set up bilateral agreements with 
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regional states such as Kenya and the Seychelles for legally transferring suspected 
pirates for trial in their national courts
166
. 
 
Operation Atalanta patrols the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in 
conjunction with NATO and CMF, and it also conducts reconnaissance and 
surveillance operations. In addition, the warships routinely conduct physical 
checks or “friendly approaches” with local vessels in order to get a better 
understanding of the maritime community in the region
167
. The friendly 
approaches are also conducted in order to assure the local fishermen that the naval 
forces are not a threat to them or their livelihood
168
.  
 
Atalanta is coordinated from two headquarters; on operational level from the 
Operational Headquarters in Northwood, London and on tactical level from the 
Force Headquarters (FHQ) onboard a flagship in the operational area. The FHQ is 
led by a Force Commander (FCdr) who is responsible of the planning and 
execution of the tactical military activities in the operational area. The FCdr 
reports to the Operation Commander in the OHQ, who commands the operation in 
conjunction with the political and military authorities in the EU. The OpCdr also 
conducts strategic military analysis with the EU military staff and reports directly 
to the Political and Security Committee. The chairman of the EU military 
committee is the main point of contact to the OpCdr
169
. 
 
The European Operations Center was activated for the first time in 2012 in 
order to facilitate coordination between the three CSDP missions, Atalanta, 
EUTM Somalia and EUCAP NESTOR. The Council decided to activate the EU 
OPCEN on a two years term, which has now been extended until 2015. This 
temporary headquarters is staffed by liaison units from the three missions and its 
activation was done in order to “improve coordination and strengthen civil-
military synergies”. Moreover, the EU OPCEN should provide support to the 
EU’s Crisis and Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), which is the civilian 
military strategic planning structure in the CSDP
170
. 
 
The activation of the EU Operations Centre can be seen in light of the debate 
on whether the EU should get permanent operational headquarters or not, a 
question which is debated among the member states as has already been discussed 
in the text. The EU OPCEN is currently not fully staffed and its functioning 
should be seen as “embryonic” according to officials171. The OPCEN in Brussels 
does not have command responsibility but is tasked to support the existing chain 
of command. Currently, it does not have the right resources to “lead”, and its 
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purpose is being debated among the member states. Some describe it as 
problematic that the EU does not have robust command and control structures, 
while others, with the United Kingdom in lead, claim that there are already 
headquarters in Europe to be used and that it would duplicate NATO’s structures. 
8.3 Operation Ocean Shield 
When Operation Ocean Shield replaced Operation Allied Protector in August 
2009 it had a more robust disruption and deterrence mandate
172
. It currently 
operates with the following four objectives: to deter and disrupt pirate operations 
at sea, coordinate international counter-piracy measures, enhance the maritime 
community’s capacity to counter piracy effectively, and develop a regional 
counter-piracy capability
173
.   
 
Its area of operation has also expanded to follow the pirate activity as it has 
moved from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Since its 
inception in 2009, it has welcomed participation from non-NATO states such as 
the Ukraine and New Zealand. While the mandate for Operation Ocean Shield can 
be seen as stronger than its two predecessors, this mandate does not cover action 
in the Somali territory (as opposed to the European Union), but it has modified the 
operation to also include the surveillance of pirate beach camps and to neutralize 
pirate skiffs
174
.  
 
The mandate for Operation Ocean Shield is decided by consensus in the North 
Atlantic Council which then delegates responsibility to the ACO (Allied 
Command Operations) and the Operational Headquarters NATO Maritime 
Command (MARCOM), located in Northwood, London, in the same 
multinational headquarters as Operation Atalanta and the British Armed Forces.  
 
Operation Ocean Shield has been estimated to cost the Alliance $5,7 million in 
annual administrative costs
175
, which are covered by the common budget. 
Currently, Operation Ocean Shield has four ships, and the Allies have debated the 
extension of the mandate as well as struggles of fulfilling force requirements
176
. 
This is likely to have impacts on the decision to extend the operational mandate, 
as well as how a possible exit strategy from the operation would look like
177
. 
NATO is also in the process in creating a Maritime Security Strategy, expected to 
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be finalized in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Cardiff in September this 
year
178
. 
8.4 Coordination Mechanisms 
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) is coordination mechanism 
which was established in 2008 to bring together stakeholders from regional states, 
navies and the shipping industry. Four conferences in Bahrain are held annually to 
share information and exchange views regarding counter-piracy efforts. The 
chairmanship of these conferences rotates from EUNAVFOR, CMF and NATO.  
In addition to these conferences there are subgroups which discuss specific issues 
such as convoy coordination, resource requirement and aviation operations
179
. 
 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) is another 
coordination mechanism which was formed in early 2009 to coordinate states and 
stakeholders to act as a common point of contact. The CGPCS is based in New 
York. 
 
Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) is located in the Operational 
Headquarters in Northwood, London and it monitors the vessels transiting the Gulf of 
Aden and the IRTC. It is manned 24-hours and shipping companies and operators are 
encouraged to register when they enter the High Risk Area (bounded by Suez and the 
Strait of Hormuz), on its homepage, by fax or email. The establishment of the 
MSCHOA was initiated by EUNAVFOR and it also coordinates group transits or 
convoys with escort by EUNAVFOR or other forces in the region. The Best 
Management Practices encourages the shipping companies and operators to register 
their transit through the high risk area and if they have sensitive cargo to the MSCHOA 
and report suspected activity to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), which is 
located in Dubai.  NATO Shipping Centre is the equivalent of the MSCHOA and is also 
located in the Operational Headquarters in Northwood
180
. 
 
MERCURY is a closed but unclassified information-sharing and communication system 
operated by the MSCHOA. The MERCURY chat function allows for real-time 
cooperation between the naval forces and industry, civil as well as military 
stakeholders
181
.    
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The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) acts as the primary point of contact for 
merchant vessels and liaises with military forces in the region in case of a piracy attack. 
The UKMTO strongly encourages that all vessels transiting the High Risk Area reports 
to the UKMTO daily – whether or not they have a private security team aboard, or are 
part of a larger national convoy. A recent report by Oceans Beyond Piracy expresses 
concerns that because the threat perception has decreased, and as a result of the 
common use of private security teams onboard, ships are now moving away from the 
Best Management Practices as well as failing to report their presence and pirate 
attacks
182
. 
The International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) was established as 
a recommended transit route for merchant vessels transiting from the Suez Canal 
through the Gulf of Aden. The transit corridor can be likened by a highway at sea 
that stretches around 550 nautical miles at sea between Puntland, Somalia, and 
Yemen. The corridor is patrolled by EU, NATO and CMF naval forces, as well as 
by Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. Merchant vessels are organized 
in convoys and in group transits
183
. 
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9 Part III  
 
This section first presents the results of the case of institutional competition 
between the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO in 
terms of institutional design, resources and coordination. It then continues to 
present the results of the four interviews. These results are divided in four sections 
according to the areas of competition, learning and experimentation, transparency 
and new solutions. When possible, the results have been triangulated with 
independent sources for increased reliability. The major themes do overlap to 
some extent and this section also includes empirical data from the debate 
“Lessons Learnt in the Gulf of Aden Operations”. 
9.1 Results 
The results show indications of institutional competition between the European 
Union and NATO when it comes to their institutional design, resources and 
coordination. When looking toward the establishment of institutional relations 
between the European Union and NATO in their defense and security policies 
there have been continuous efforts to make them complement each other’s 
capabilities as well as competition of which organization should take the lead in 
European security and defense matters. In terms of institutional design the CSDP 
structures are based on NATO’s institutional design 184 and the parallel 
institutions such as the NAC-PSC, the EUMC-NATO Military Committee as well 
as the double-hatted roles of the DSACEUR and MILREPs could possibly act as 
facilitators for formal and informal cooperation.  
 
The processes when establishing institutional relations also show that the 
competition should not be seen as competition between the institutions as such, 
but as the competing interests of nation states which are members of one or both 
organizations. With regards to resources, the intersecting membership leads to the 
two organizations using assets from the same national pools of resources, and 
with the member states challenged with the same cuts in defense budgets, this 
could be seen as an indicator for a stronger case of institutional competition 
between the EU and NATO. However, the various levels within the organizations 
seem to create cases of intra-institutional competition, which is visible in the 
European Union’s CSDP which is also related to the funding mechanisms of a 
civil and military budget.  
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The background to the establishment of Operation Atalanta and Operation Ocean 
Shield shows the interdependence between the European Union and NATO in 
their counter-piracy operations, and the broader coordination efforts introduced in 
the previous chapter add a dimension to this multifaceted picture. 
9.2 Competition or cooperation – or both? 
 
“It never became a question on the EU versus NATO, instead the multiple 
actors worked as a springboard for greater international cooperation
185” 
 
The interviews first focused on general aspects of cooperation, coordination and 
possible institutional competition between the European Union and NATO. The 
case of institutional competition on political level was supported by the 
interviews, and so was the notion that the deadlock on political level has given 
actors more scope to enhance informal cooperation.  
 
There is consensus from the interviews and from the debate that the cooperation 
and coordination between EU and NATO and other forces in the operational area 
is excellent. Despite the number of actors involved performing similar tasks, 
neither of the respondents express concerns for duplication of efforts in the 
counter-piracy efforts
186
.  At the same time, the case of institutional competition is 
recognized by the respondents and it is mentioned times that once issues reach 
political “things become tricky”. Three of the respondents also point to how 
political trickiness (referring to how the European Union and NATO cannot 
openly discuss the real issues do to the participation problem) has made the actors 
on operational level “solve the problems before they reach political level187”. 
Moreover, the respondents also point out that while cooperation is easy on 
operational level and through informal contacts, this cooperation is difficult or 
non-existent on formal level.  
 
Two of the respondents describe discussions on national level on to which format 
to contribute to when the EU and NATO are performing similar tasks in the same 
operational area. The respondents also acknowledge that discussions of this kind 
are common but not something that officials will speak of publically.  
 
By participating in these operations, states expect to get more insight and 
influence in the organizations as such, and hope to strengthen relations with other 
states, as well as testing their military technology and exercising interoperability 
with other actors
188
. Two of the respondents express some frustration of the lack 
of functioning meeting formats, and one of them points out that the EU and 
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NATO need to communicate and cooperate, because if they do not, then it could 
risk the lives of operational staff as well as civilians
189
. One interviewee remarks 
that while current meeting formats do not touch upon the important issues, it is 
important that these formats exist once they become necessary for the real 
discussions
190
.  
 
Several of the interviewees expressed that cooperation between the navies, 
coalitions and nation states, is working well because they are all mariners doing 
their job – “we, as humble seamen cooperate191”. To them, the discussions and 
political impasses in Brussels are irrelevant
192
.  
 
Moreover, an added value of the many actors involved is the opportunity for ad 
hoc cooperation with other states, such as Russia and China. Due to the 
sensitiveness related to formal political cooperation with these states, the 
cooperation has to take place “under the surface”. For instance, American and 
Russian warships were planned to conduct joint operations by going from the Gulf 
of Aden to the Mediterranean Sea, ready to respond to the instabilities in Syria. 
This is naturally a very sensitive political matter, and after the Russian 
intervention in the Ukraine, it was cancelled
193
.   
 
While the “trickiness” on political level partially relates to states using their single 
membership to block efforts for formal cooperation and to increase transparency 
between the EU and NATO, it also relates to the division between the military and 
political structures within the EU and NATO. One NATO official describes this 
division to be significant than the number of actors involved when it comes to 
coordination of the missions. Since the mandate to perform certain tasks must be 
decided by 28 member states unanimously, the deliberations on political level are 
seen as time-consuming and keep the military staff from conducting the 
operational planning when waiting for the political decision
194
.   
 
When it comes to formal frameworks for cooperation, one of the interviewees 
expresses that the operations under Berlin Plus arrangements have been 
successful, but that we are unlikely to see similar operations before the 
“participation problem” is resolved195. The same interviewee also states that the 
outcomes of institutionalized cooperation between the European Union and 
NATO could have “extraordinary results”196.   
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One researcher has argued that nations that are member of both organizations are 
likely to contribute to Operation Atalanta before Operation Ocean Shield since 
Atalanta is better equipped, has more resources and a broader mandate. While 
both the EU and NATO emphasize the importance of a comprehensive approach, 
NATO has not managed to come to political agreement to expand the mandate, 
and it has not formed similar bilateral agreements with regional states such as the 
European Union. According to one of the respondents, it is not about competing 
institutional frameworks, it is about those states, such as France and the 
Netherlands, that prefer civil and crisis management conducted within the 
framework for the European Union and not NATO
197
.  
 
In conclusion, there is both competition and cooperation between the European 
Union and NATO, and this competition can be viewed as dealing more with the 
states involved than the institutional design per se. Moreover, the effects of the 
competition on political level can be viewed as a deadlock which directly leads to 
operational staff working around it. This seems to be an unofficial agreement on 
both political and military level, and according to one of the respondents, many 
officials speak openly about enhanced cooperation, but have no aims to actually 
pursue this, instead they will speak about “giving it more time” to develop forms 
for institutionalized cooperation. This is due to a perception that states are more 
influential on EU level than in NATO
198
. 
 
9.3 Learning and experimentation  
 
The idea drawn from the theoretical framework is that learning and 
experimentation evolve from a diversity of actors able to learn from their 
competitors through “friendly rivalry”. Furthermore, the idea is that this way of 
learning should be seen as a discovery procedure, and that experimentation is a 
trial-error process to identify the best solutions
199
.  
 
The parallel operations in the Gulf of Aden, combined with the number of actors 
operating under the same mandate create a good case for institutional competition 
in theory.  
 
The navies have shown great proactive measures and cases of trial-and-error in 
order to find the best solutions. The shipping industry is most likely the most 
creative actor in this aspect, and this experimentation or solutions can be found in 
the Best Management Practices. When piracy started to surface in the Gulf of 
Aden, the shipping industry made sure that vessels transiting the high risk areas 
increased their speed; when attacks continued, they built citadels and used barb 
wire and water cannons to stop the pirates to board ships. These changes and 
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experimentation could be done easily since the shipping industry does not have 
the same constituents to answer to as the multilateral organizations do. These 
actors cannot be seen as competing institutions, since they do not have the same 
constituents or can be seen as competing for the same resources, mandates and 
tasks.  
 
When looking at the EU and NATO, it is clear that their mandates have evolved 
simultaneously, but it is not easy to tell if the development comes from the 
diversity of actors or from other factors. What can be said is that the European 
Union through its political processes has had chances to conduct experimentation 
in order to find improve its practices and find the best solutions. While NATO has 
emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to counter piracy, the 
European Union has been able to realize it.  
 
This has been done through a number of creative and pragmatic solutions, such as 
the activation of the EU Operations Center for the first time, the European Union 
Training Mission Somalia (which since it was not deemed safe in Somalia, was 
conducted in Uganda
200
); and lastly the launch of its first civilian CSDP mission 
to take regional approach, EUCAP NESTOR. Respondents with experience from 
these missions recognize that these measures should be seen as embryonic, and 
need time to mature. 
 
 The “discovery process” can also be seen in the way that the European Union has 
dealt with problems it has encountered since establishing its naval operation. It 
has handled the judicial aspects of piracy (relating to the difficulty in collecting 
evidence and to prosecute the suspected pirates) by forming bilateral agreements 
with regional states which allows for transfer of suspected pirates for judicial trial. 
According to one of the respondents, also NATO has tried to have similar judicial 
agreements, but according to this respondent, NATO does not have the same 
resources for “political buy-ins” in the regional states, and what is more, due to 
the difficulties to achieve political consensus within the Alliance, this has not 
been achieved
201
. When asked about the prospect for NATO’s future in capacity 
building measures similar to those of the European Union, one of the respondents 
replies that this is “unlikely”202. The respondent also explains that the lack of 
political consensus among the NATO member states to engage in capacity 
building measures is due to states strategically choosing the European Union as a 
format for capacity building, since they expect to have a more powerful voice in 
the European Commission than in the North Atlantic Council.  
 
When asked about lessons learnt for future operations, the four interviewees state 
that the multifaceted characteristics of Somalia, which have shaped the counter-
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piracy measures, make it unlikely that the specific counter-piracy measures will 
be applied to future maritime operations. They point to the lack of political 
institutions in Somalia which is not the case in for instance the Gulf of Guinea off 
the coast of Nigeria which is currently threatening to eclipse the Gulf of Aden as 
the world’s most pirate-ridden waters.  
 
However, some more general lessons learnt can be identified from the Gulf of 
Aden operations. The first is to focus the military operations to “optimize every 
Dollar and Euro”203. This has been achieved by focusing the military efforts 
around the monsoon period where the piracy activity is at its lowest. Moreover, it 
deals with combining security with training on various levels, and also the notion 
that security and development go hand in hand. From a NATO point of view, 
lessons learnt are also the success of increasing cooperation with its partner 
countries from the ICI and global partners
204
.    
 
Lastly, the counter-piracy measures do give examples of learning, discovery and 
experimentation and these measures could very well be linked to the diversity of 
actors involved. It seems apparent that there are actors within NATO that would 
like to see the similar measures as those from the European Union developed also 
within the framework for NATO; however, since NATO has not yet been able to 
come to agreement on its way ahead when it comes to capacity building measures, 
there is not really a case of competition between the EU and NATO in this aspect.  
 
In conclusion, the lack of a case of institutional competition gives the theoretical 
framework a poor explanatory capacity in this sense.   
 
9.4 Transparency 
 
“SHADE is an invention but also a new paradigm. This paradigm is easy, 
simple and transparent.
205”  
 
The SHADE mechanism is in fact brought up by all respondents as a good 
example of creative new measures to counter piracy
206
. Its meeting formats which 
allow for all relevant stakeholders and regional actors to discuss future solutions, 
share views, ideas and information is seen as a necessary tool for transparency. 
Also the MERCURY system to share information and alerts can be views as a 
creative invention in a similar way. The MERCURY is said to be easily accessed 
for the relevant stakeholders, civilian as well as military, and it allows for instant 
information sharing. MERCURY also provides a contact with the Operational 
Headquarters in Northwood from the shipping community and navies.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
203
 Debate in Brussels May 2014  
204
 Ibid.  
205
 Ibid.   
206
 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4  
  50 
The respondents state that the initiative to establish the SHADE mechanism was a 
direct effect from not being able to convene in formal meeting sessions.  
“We couldn’t get unity of command, so we created unity of effect207”.  
 
This relates to how the naval missions could not have one formal joint command 
structure for coordination of the operations which led the operational staff to 
create their own structures with the industry and other relevant stakeholders, who 
due to different reasons were unwilling or unable to participate in the EU or 
NATO coalitions. Also, since the European Union and NATO could not have a 
joint command structure, this was resolved by co-locating the operational 
headquarters as two separate headquarters in the same building in Northwood, 
London.   
 
Both these solutions in order to get the right information out and to coordinate the 
operations can be seen as directly related to the fact that the European Union and 
NATO do not have formal forums for discussing their counter-piracy operations. 
Yet they are conducting similar missions with the same objective and under the 
same United Nations mandate, also according to the very same military standards 
and with the same national resources.    
 
While there seems to be the general agreement that the information-sharing is 
transparent within the operations, there is also one respondent who points to 
difficulties from political level which has had negative impacts on the missions.     
 
The respondent gives the example of when Sweden had rotational lead of 
Operation Atalanta. Both Atalanta and NATO use the same secret systems for 
transferring positions via NATO’s encryption keys. Since Sweden was not a 
NATO member it did not get access to these keys in order to properly conduct the 
coordination needed. Even if Sweden eventually did get the encryption keys, they 
were not able to make them work for the time of FHQ Atalanta.
208
. The 
respondent draws a direct link to the Cyprus and Turkey impasse to explain this. 
Due to fear that politically sensitive information would reach Cyprus, all non-
NATO states, also those states in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, could expect to 
encounter similar difficulties. 
 
Since institutional competition according to the theoretical framework is expected 
to act as a correctional force, the respondent was asked if this difficulty, three 
years later, would have been corrected, but the respondent saw this as “highly 
unlikely”209. Moreover, the same respondent claims that operational staff are 
asked by their superiors not to put anything down in written form since there is 
always a risk that information reaching political level information will be blocked 
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by “one certain member state”210. 
 
When looking at the measures through SHADE and MERCURY, these are 
examples of how institutional competition can lead to increased cooperation and 
transparency between actors. Since it was not seen as possible to have a 
formalized joint structure for command and coordination – also since there was no 
institutionalized form of cooperation between EU and NATO in their counter-
piracy operations – it made operational staff together with the industry find 
relevant ways to get around this difficulty. This is in line with the theory that 
institutional competition could lead to increased transparency, and also with the 
line of reasoning described in part 1.4 on new cooperative security, which predicts 
new forms for cooperation, where actions can origin from the outside, and not 
from the inside
211
. This is a good example of this kind of cooperation which 
comes from different actors and not one dominating multilateral institution, and 
instead is shaped from several different actors.  
 
As was mentioned in the earlier stages of this paper, the idea to examine 
transparency in the operations is related to the aspect of democracy, which in turn 
relates to openness to an institution’s constituents. In these cases, the institutional 
competition seems to have led to the opposite. While it increases transparency to 
stakeholders in the operational area, institutional competition between the EU and 
NATO, or maybe even the political-military division within the organizations, 
seems to have created a policy of transparency as long as it stays on operational 
level. And from the interviews, it seems like this is a known fact on both political 
and military level
212
. While this could be seen as leading to increased operational 
efficiency in terms of reaching the mission objective faster, and creating 
corrective measures, in terms of openness to constituents, the levels of 
transparency are uncertain. One could argue that the political level of the 
institutions have delegated power to the military levels – but for the citizens 
expected to “own their institutions”213, the discrepancy between what is being 
published in the official communiqués and what is being told by operational staff 
show two different pictures, which could raise concerns of transparency and 
openness.  
 
9.5 New Solutions   
 
The past three sections of the results part have all provided examples that 
could be viewed as new creative solutions in the Gulf of Aden operations. What is 
relevant for this thesis is if these solutions can be seen as an effect of institutional 
competition, and also if they can be generalizable to future operations and 
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international cooperation.  
 
In the debate held on the topic Lessons Learnt from the Gulf of Aden Operations, 
EU and NATO staff expressed enthusiasm for the lessons learnt from these 
missions. The SHADE mechanism was described as a new paradigm and model 
for international cooperation, which could be used in other security related policy 
areas.  
 
One expert in the panel debate also recounted a flexible meeting format held at 
NATO with the 28 Allies plus Navies. This expert describes a meeting with 
NATO members and relevant stakeholders from the industry, regional states and 
the European Union around the same table as “the most extraordinary thing ever” 
and a “feeling of ‘’we are the world’” since it allowed for discussions on all 
dimensions of the piracy problem
214
.  
 
Moreover, the decision to co-locate the EU and NATO maritime headquarters in 
Northwood, London was recounted as “quite extraordinary” in this debate, since it 
allows for cooperation on informal and personal level without the need for formal 
political guidelines, this can in a sense be seen as a way of getting around the 
competition on political level.   
 
When touching upon the topic of solutions, it is interesting to see whether this is 
viewed as solutions of the piracy issue as such, or seen as related to a solution to 
the political deadlock in EU and NATO relations. One respondent specifically 
points to how officials openly speak about the importance of enhancing 
cooperation, while on informal level there is no rush to speed things up. The same 
respondent claims that the chances of “bottom-up” processes are unlikely to affect 
institutional policies due to the distinct division of political and military within the 
organizations – also since this information does not reach political level215.  
 
While the experts in the debate in an open forum spoke enthusiastically about the 
lessons learnt and the applicability in other security related areas, the interviewees 
generally took a more “sober” approach. While they believed that the counter-
piracy efforts were a success, they were cautious when speaking on how these 
measures could be used in future maritime operations, instead they pointed to the 
specific characteristics of Somali based piracy, which are seen as inherently 
different from piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the Strait of Malacca.   
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10 Conclusions  
 
What are the lessons learnt from the Gulf of Aden Operations?  
 
This thesis set out to assess how institutional competition can contribute to 
improved cooperation and new solutions. It did so with the objective of giving a 
new perspective to the debate on EU and NATO relations which is usually 
assessed in a negative way, when the institutions are not analyzed in isolation 
from one another. The choice of case study was seen as timely and relevant for the 
institutions which are in process of developing new maritime security concepts, 
but also relevant to test the theory’s explanatory capacity on a case of institutional 
competition in the realm of security.  
 
The paper has hypothesized, after indications from the preparatory stages of the 
study and previous research, that institutional competition can generate positive 
outcomes such as learning and experimentation, increased transparency and new 
solutions. A secondary objective of this thesis was also that the results would be 
generalizable to other cases of institutional competition in international relations. 
 
This paper first set out to build a case of institutional competition, by explaining 
how the relationship between the European Union and NATO has been shaped 
from the end of the Cold War until today, the main themes related to effects of 
institutional competition were then assessed through interviews with relevant 
stakeholders and contrasted with academic literature.  
 
The results show a case of institutional competition between the European Union 
and NATO in the field of security. Since military operations are funded by the 
principle “costs lie where they fall”, in terms of both military assets and financial 
resources, these are derived from the same pool of national resources. In times of 
austerity and for two institutions conducting the similar tasks this is a textbook 
example of “competition by favorable institutional frameworks” as outlined in the 
theoretical framework. This case is also strengthened when looking at different 
national interests, such as how states expect to gain insight and influence when 
participating in the operations.  
 
The interviews as well as the literature and comments from the panel debate also 
show that the counter-piracy missions are seen as successful in suppressing 
piracy, and that there are many added values from the operations. These added 
values include new inventions for cooperation such as the SHADE mechanism, 
initiatives to co-locate headquarters and to cooperate with other actors “under the 
surface”. In theory, this should indicate that institutional competition can 
contribute to improved cooperation and new solutions, but in several of the cases 
the correlation between the European Union and NATO is not clear enough to 
strengthen this argument. For instance, the fact that NATO has not been able to 
come to agreement within its own structures to launch similar capacity building 
measures such as those of the European Union, it cannot be said to be competing 
in this area. This leads to poor explanatory capacity for the theoretical approach. 
Since the European Union alone has shown great examples of experimenting and 
creative solutions, it would have been interesting to see the effects if NATO had 
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been in competition in means for civil and capacity building measures when it 
comes to bilateral agreements with regional states for instance.   
 
One of the most interesting findings is however how the obvious competition and 
political impasse on political level in Brussels can be directly linked to improved 
cooperation and ad hoc solutions in the operational theatres. As has been 
illustrated in the text, one of the driving forces behind the very creation of 
Operation Ocean Shield was that Turkey wished to see for a counter-piracy 
operation led by NATO. While the two operations initially performing the same 
tasks under the same mandate they were unaware of each other on formal political 
level due to the lack of meeting formats between the EU and NATO.  As a result 
of this, the operational staff and other actors created unity of effect. To find 
solutions of this sort, such as the SHADE meeting formats, the clear division of 
labor between different coordination points of contacts, all make examples of the 
lessons learnt from the Gulf of Aden operations. In addition, to engage with all 
relevant stakeholders, such as civil and military staff, industry and non-
governmental organizations should be a lesson learnt for future operations.  
 
When it comes to transparency and democracy the idea from the theoretical 
framework is that institution in general should work for the best interest of its 
constituents. The constituents in in this case can be seen as the citizens of the 
European Union and NATO member states who have delegated power to national 
decision-makers. In these operations there are indications that information does 
not go beyond operational level, and that this is a known fact on operational as 
well as political level in the case of counter-piracy operations. This makes it 
relevant to think of what would be in the best interest of the constituents, if is 
about the operations reaching their goals or if it is a transparent process with 
accessible information in the mean time.    
 
As concluding words, although the theory cannot adequately explain all aspects in 
this case of EU and NATO interaction, it has been relevant to look at the positive 
effects, such as the ad hoc solutions and inclusion of new actors and all relevant 
stakeholders. For future studies on institutional competition in the realm of 
security, it would be interesting to involve more actors as well as using a broader 
dimension of the concept of security, such as looking at security and development 
as two concepts that go hand in hand.  
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Appendix A  
 
Examples of Interview Questions 
 
 
Operation Ocean Shield  
• How is cooperation between EU and NATO? 
• Are there signs of competition between the European Union and NATO?  
• Why are there three different maritime coalitions? 
• What lessons can be learnt on organizational level as well as national level?  
• What are the most important lessons learnt for future maritime operations? 
• How will NATO conduct capacity building measures?  
• What can you say about transparency in these missions? How does the right 
information reach the right persons?  
• Can you give examples of “corrective measures” taken since the inception of 
the operations? 
 
 
Operation ATALANTA 
• How is cooperation between EU and NATO on political level? 
• How is coordination with other major naval anti-piracy operations in the area 
conducted? 
• Are there lessons learned from Atalanta that can be used for future maritime 
operations? 
• What can you say about cooperation and coordination between EU and NATO 
in the operations? 
• What is the overall effect of Operation Atalanta so far?  
• Can you give examples of “corrective measures” taken since the inception of 
the mission? 
 
 
 
